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Abstract 
The barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank. The 
regulator/insurer of the bank owns a down-and-in call option on the bank’s assets which can be balanced against the 
expected coverage cost. This paper examines how the bank’s credit risk hedging operation affects its spread behavior 
and performance and how these effects vary at various levels of the regulatory insurance fund protection. We find 
that an increase in the bank’s credit risk hedging has a negative effect on its loan rate, deposit rate, default risk, and 
liability value. The regulatory deposit insurance fund protection reinforces the reduction in bank default risk, thereby 
contributing to the stability of the banking system. The insurance fund protection with credit risk hedging confirms 
the requirement of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Keywords: credit risk hedging, deposit insurance fund, spread behavior, default risk, barrier 
1. Introduction 
Credit derivatives are credit risk transfer tools that have been extensively used by banks over the last decades to 
actively manage credit risk (Note 1). The recent financial crisis raises a fundamental issue about the role of credit 
risk hedging including its effect on bank behavior, particularly from the standpoint of financial stability. Not 
surprisingly, credit risk transfer activities help manage bank risk (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). Wagner and Marsh 
(2006) also suggest that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of 
improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. However, 
Bedendo and Bruno (2012) demonstrate that the contribution of credit risk transfer with credit swaps to the 
2007-2009 financial turmoil has been widely debated. A common view argues that credit risk transfer practices spur 
excessive credit growth and increase risk taking as a result of reduced monitoring incentives in credit risk transfer 
users (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
Parallel to an increased importance of buying credit default swaps in order to hedging banks’ trading (Mengle, 2007), 
there has been an ongoing discussion about the role of deposit insurance fund protection to influence bank behavior 
and make banks more robust against financial shocks, i.e., to strengthen the soundness and stability of banks in the 
usual parlance of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Hamilton (2013) reports that the federal 
backstop, funded by assessments on banks, is at $33 billion at the end of 2012, resulting in a reserve ratio of 0.45 
percent, up from a deficit of $20.9 billion at the end of 2009 as the credit crisis caused banks to fail. The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) requires that the deposit insurance fund reserve 
ratio reach 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020 (Note 2). This can be understood that inadequate deposit insurance 
funding can lead to costly delays in resolving failed banks and to the loss of credibility of the deposit insurance 
system (International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2009). Given the divergent views in the literature on credit risk 
transfer, the issue of the effects credit risk hedging has on bank performance, the magnitude of these effects, and how 
they might differ across different levels of regulatory deposit insurance fund protection in a financial crisis boils 
down to a crucial question. In particular, the goal of this paper is to examine the effects of credit risk hedging on 
bank interest margin, i.e., the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate, and bank default risk explicitly 
considering regulatory deposit insurance fund protection. 
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Bank interest margin and default risk in banking are two key issues that concern bank managers. The bank interest 
margin is one of the principal elements of bank net cash flows and after-tax earnings, which is often used in the 
literature as a proxy for the financial intermediation efficiency (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Wong, 2011). Bank 
default risk related to bank survival is central not only in strategic decisions made by banks, but also in decisions 
made by regulators concerned about banking stability. Knowing how credit risk hedging affects bank performance 
including margin and default risk in a financial crisis is also of paramount importance for regulators contemplating 
micro- and macro-prudential banking regulation, particularly regulatory deposit insurance fund protection. 
In light of previous work, the purpose of this paper is to develop a path-dependent, barrier option model of bank 
spread behavior that integrates regulatory deposit insurance fund protection into the firm-theoretic approach to 
banking and analyze the interaction between the protection regulation and credit risk hedging including its effect on 
spread behavior and further default risk in an individual bank’s equity return. In particular, we consider the 
simultaneous impacts on the bank’s loan rate and deposit rate (and thus on the bank’s margin) from changes in 
hedging and regulation. The results of the model show that an increase in the credit risk hedging has a negative effect 
on loan rate, deposit rate, default risk, and the liability of the bank. In addition, we find that deposit insurance fund 
protection wakens this reduction in loan rate and deposit rate, but reinforces this reduction in bank default risk, and 
has an ambiguous effect on this reduction in the bank’s liability. Furthermore, the direct effect of credit risk hedging 
on the default risk in the bank’s equity return is unambiguously negative in sign. The indirect effect of credit risk 
hedging makes the bank less prudent and more prone to loan risk-taking, and simultaneously makes the bank reduce 
its deposit volume. The former adversely affects the stability of the banking system while the latter contributes the 
stability. This model provides us with a hunch that this indirect effect is positive in sign. The indirect effect is 
insufficient to offset the direct effect to give an overall negative response of bank default risk to an increase in credit 
risk hedging. Our results are largely consistent with the empirical findings of Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) and 
Wagner and Marsh (2006). A further contribution of this paper is that it shows that deposit insurance fund protection 
reinforces this overall negative response of bank default risk that meets the requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
large value of the FDIC’s contingent asset compared to its contingent liability implies that any deposit insurance 
scheme can be strengthened by barrier policies with bank credit hedging practices. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related literature. Section 3 develops the basic structure of the 
model. Section 4 derives the solutions of the model and the comparative static analysis. Section 5 performs a 
numerical analysis to confirm the comparative static results. The final section concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature 
Our theory of credit risk hedging is related to three strands of the literature. The first is the literature on credit risk 
transfer and banking stability, in which Duffie (2008), Bedendo and Bruno (2012), and Pausch and Welzel (2012) are 
major contributors. Duffie (2008) summarizes different aspects concerning credit risk transfer and on the whole takes 
a positive view: the principle benefits of credit risk transfer are earning-asset portfolio diversification and cost 
reduction of raising external capital for loan intermediation. Bedendo and Bruno (2012) document some potential 
beneficial effects of credit risk transfer on the economy since the funds released through credit risk transfer are 
subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply. Pausch and Welzel (2012) find that when capital adequacy 
regulation accepts credit default swaps as an instrument to mitigate credit risk, banks will engage in credit default 
swaps trading (Note 3). In other words, the bank reduces loan volume and increases interest rate on loans as a 
reaction to an increase in credit risk. While we also examine credit risk transfer, our focus on credit risk hedging 
aspects of deposit insurance fund protection takes our analysis in a different direction. 
The second strand is the deposit insurance fund protection literature. Sheehan (1998) focuses on the capitalization 
issue of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and shows that the funding arrangement is sufficient to maintain BIF 
solvency if the prior history of losses is a good indicator of future losses. Oshinsky (1999) shows bank consolidation 
increasing the risk of BIF insolvency. Schoenmaker and Gros (2012) suggest that a deposit insurance authority 
should be established to stabilize the retail deposit base and resolve troubled cross-border banks and the deposit 
insurance fund would be fed through regular risk-based deposit insurance premiums with a fiscal backstop. 
Episcopos (2008) demonstrates that raising the regulatory deposit insurance protection leads to a transfer of wealth 
from the bank’s stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk. The primary 
difference between our model and these papers is that we consider the effects of deposit insurance fund protection 
with credit risk hedging on bank interest margin and default risk. 
The third strand is the literature on banking modeling approach to crises and normal times. Two related option-based 
approaches, in particular have been employed in the literature to model regulation to banking. A number of writers, 
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e.g., Ronn and Verma (1986), Episcopos (2004), and Vassalou and Xing (2004), have adopted the path-independent 
option model based on Merton (1974) as their analytical apparatus. The principal advantage of this approach is the 
explicit treatment of uncertainty which has long played a prominent role in discussions of banking behavior. This 
approach, however, omits a key aspect of the problem of early closure particularly during financial crises. The papers 
including Bhattacharya et al. (1998), Brockman and Turtle (2003), and Episcopos (2008), for example, propose a 
framework for corporate security based on path-dependent, barrier option models. The fundamental advantage of this 
approach is also the explicit treatment of uncertainty, in particular early bank closure during a financial turmoil. In 
addition, the idea of early bank closure has deep roots in financial crisis period, during which protecting the 
insurance funds and the stability of the banking system are dominant issues (Acharya and Dreyfus, 1989; Brockman 
and Turtle, 2003). We use the methology of path dependency, integrate deposit insurance fund protection into the 
industrial organization approach to banking, and analyze the interaction between fund protection and credit risk 
hedging. Our contribution consists in including credit risk hedging and deposit insurance fund protection, and 
accounting for their impacts on bank interest margin and default risk in retail banking. 
Overall, the literature to which our work is most directly related is that on conformity, particularly Wagner and 
Marsh (2006). Other examples are Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Williams (2007), Episcopos (2008), Bedendo and 
Bruno (2012), and Pausch and Welzel (2012). The fundamental insight shared by these papers is that conformity is 
generated by a design to distinguish oneself from the type with which one wishes not to be identified. This insight is 
an important aspect of credit risk hedging which is perfectly in line with the deposit insurance fund protection 
objective of making bank failure less likely. What distinguishes our work from this literature is our focus on the 
commingling of the assessment of the hedging with the assessment of the deposit insurance fund protection and, in 
particular, the emphasis we put on the bank spread behavior during a financial crisis. 
3. The Model 
To model bank behavior, we consider a banking firm that makes decisions in a single period horizon with two dates, 
0 and 1, [0,1]t . At 0t  , the bank has the following balance sheet: 
(1 ) L L B D K                                    (1) 
where (1 ) 0L   with 0 1   is the amount of non-swapped loans and 0L   is the amount of swapped 
loans for credit risk hedging, 0B   is the volume of risk-free liquid assets, 0D   is the quantity of deposits, and 
0K   is the stock of equity capital. 
The bank’s loans belong to a single homogeneous class of fixed claims that mature at 1t  . The bank enjoys market 
power in its loan market. The decision on loans is made via the setting of loan rate 0LR   at 0t  . The demand 
for loans is governed by a downward-sloping demand function ( )LL R  where / 0LL R    and 2 2/ 0LL R   . 
This demand function is assumed to be a concave one (Tsai and Lin, 2013). Non-swapped loans are risky in that they 
are subject to non-performance. In addition to loans, liquid assets are also included in the earning-asset portfolio. 
Liquid assets B  held by the bank during the period earn the security-market interest rate of 0R  . The 
earning-asset portfolio of the bank is financed partly by deposits. The bank also enjoys market power in its deposit 
market. The supply of deposits is governed by an upward-sloping supply function ( )DD R  where 0DR   is the 
deposit rate chosen by the bank. The supply of deposits is assumed to be a concave function with the conditions of 
/ 0DD R    and 2 2/ 0DD R    (Pausch and Welzel, 2012). By regulation, the bank is subject to the capital 
adequacy requirement: K qD  where q  is the required capital-to-deposits ratio (VanHoose, 2007). The capital 
requirement constraint will be binding as long as R  is sufficiently higher than DR  (Wong, 1997). In the case of 
binding constraint, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as (1 ) (1 )L L B q D      , which will be used in our model. 
As noted by Santomero (1984), the choice of an appropriate goal in modeling the bank’s optimization problem 
remains a controversial issue. In general, if the problem of early bank closure is emphasized, then the bank’s 
objective is to maximize its market value based on a path-dependent, barrier option framework. The selection of our 
model’s objective function follows Episcopos (2008). Specifically, we use the barrier option formula of Merton 
(1973) as a tool to understand the down-and-out call (DOC) option to bank equity in order to address the problem of 
early closure during a financial turmoil. It is argued that path dependency is an intrinsic and fundamental 
characteristic of assets because equity can be knocked out whenever a legally binding barrier is breached and will be 
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priced as a DOC option (Brockman and Turtle, 2003). The market value of the bank’s equity subject to Eq. (1) can be 
written as: 
D O C S C D I C                                  (2) 
where 
1 2( ) ( )SC VN d Ze N d
   
(1 )(1 )LV R L    with d V V d t V d W    
(1 ) (1 )[(1 ) ] (1 )D LZ R D R q D L R L           
DR R    
2
1
1 (ln )
2
Vd
Z
   , 2 1d d    
2 2 2
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
H HD IC V N b Z e N b
V V
      
H bZ , 0 1b  , 
2
1
2
  
 
2 2
1
1 (ln )
2
Hb
V Z
   , 2 1b b    
Expression of DOC in Eq. (2) is explained as follows. The market value of the bank’s underlying assets follows a 
geometric Brownian motion of dV  where V  is the repayment value of the bank’s non-swapped loans, with an 
instantaneous drift  , an instantaneous volatility  , and a standard Wiener process W . We denote by Z  the book 
value of the net-obligation payments, that is the difference between the payments to depositors and the two repayments 
from the liquid-asset investments and the counterparty in the credit risk transfer transaction. Note that   is the cost 
rate of hedging credit risk, which is assumed to be ( )LR R    to induce the bank to participate in the credit risk 
transfer (Note 4). If the hedging price is too high where ( )LR R   , the decision of hedging will not be made and 
the bank will shift its investments to the liquid-asset market from its loan portfolio in order to gain risk diversification. 
  is specified as the compounded riskless rate of return. H  is the asset value that triggers bankruptcy, i.e., the 
barrier or the knock-out value of the bank. We follow Brockman and Turtle (2003) that the default barrier level H  is 
proportional to Z  by a barrier-to-debt ratio of b , H bZ  where 0 1b  . ( )N   is the cumulative 
distribution function for a standard normal random variable. 
The term SC in Eq. (2) are recognized as the expected asset value and present value of the net-obligation payments 
using the standard call option view of the bank. The barrier H  can be viewed as the value of non-swapped assets 
above which creditors cannot force dissolution. The omission of terms involving the barrier H , the term DIC (the 
down-and-in call option) in Eq. (2), will behave significant consequences especially when the likelihood of meeting 
the barrier is substantial. The DIC can be interpreted as bank depositors (non-negative) claim, which demonstrates 
protection to depositors by allowing them to “call in their chips” before asset values deteriorate further. It is seen 
easily that the barrier option in Eq. (2) is a wider class than the standard call option because as H  approaches zero 
in Eq. (2), the DIC vanishes, and we can arrive at the usual Merton (1974) call option price that captures the value of 
bank equity. 
Next, our approach in calculating default risk measures using information about Eq. (2) is very similar to the one 
used by Brockman and Turtle (2003). The default probability is the probability that V  will be less than Z . The 
default probability, the default risk in the bank’s equity return in the DOC valuation, is given by: 
2
1 3( ) ( )
a
defP N a e N a                                   (3) 
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where 
2
1
1 (ln )
2
bZa
V
   , 
2
2 2
2 ( ) ln
2
b Za
V
 
 
2
3
1 (ln )
2
b Za
V
   
 
Although Eq. (3) estimates only a risk-neutral probability of bankruptcy, this still provides a meaningful ranking of 
the bank according to its alternative susceptibility to failure. 
It is also interesting to use information about Eq. (2) to illustrate the bank’s liability. As the barrier increases, debt 
behaves more like equity and equity converges to zero. Our approach in calculating the value of liabilities is very 
similar to the one outlined by Episcopos (2008). That is written as: 
Ins Ze Put DIC                                    (4) 
where 
2 1( ) ( )Put Ze N d VN d
     
and where Put  is the value of the standard European put. 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (4) represent the Merton (1974) value of debt. The first term is the 
discount value of the payment to depositors. The second term is the put option or the value of the fair insurance 
needed in order to make deposits risk free. The third term represents the value of the FDIC’s contingent asset or the 
knock-out value of the bank. Depositors would cash in on this option if they were able to jointly seize the asset of the 
bank when the bank’s assets dropped to H . As pointed out by Episcopos (2008), in practice, coordination costs 
would make it difficult for depositors to jointly take legal actions against the bank. As much more suitable 
environment for the barrier model to hold is created if regulation is in effect. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) has conferred wide powers to the FDIC to seize the assets of the bank and 
act in the place of insured depositors in the courts. In other words, the FDIC controls the barrier. Given current 
regulation statuses, it is safe to say that the value of liabilities in Eq. (4) is in the hands of the FDIC, especially after 
the FDIC has been named a receiver. In turn, the FDIC has to allocate this value to the insured depositors, other 
claimants, and itself. 
4. Solutions and Results 
With all the assumption in place, we are now ready to solve for the bank’s optimal choices of loan rate and deposit 
rate simultaneously. The bank seeks to maximize the market value of the equity based on Eq. (2). The first-order 
conditions for the maximization of the bank’s equity are: 
0
L L L
DOC SC DIC
R R R
                                    (5) 
0
D D D
DOC SC DIC
R R R
                                    (6) 
We assume that the equilibrium is locally strictly stable, which implies that 
2
2 0,
L
DOC
R
   
2
2 0,
D
DOC
R
   and 
2 2 2 2
2 2 0
L D L D D L
DOC DOC DOC DOC
R R R R R R
                    (7) 
In addition, think of 2 / L DDOC R R    as / ( / )D LR DOC R    . That is, the term represents the change in the 
marginal equity value of loan rate of being a bit more “aggressive” when DR  set by the bank becomes more 
aggressive. If 2 / L DDOC R R    is negative, we say that the bank regards its loan rate as a strategic substitute to its 
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deposit rate, and if 2 / 0L DDOC R R    , we say that the bank regards its loan rate as a strategic complement based 
on the argument in the spirit of Bulow et al. (1985). The interpretation of 2 / D LDOC R R    follows a similar 
argument as in the case of 2 / L DDOC R R    above. The first term on the right-hand side in Eq. (5) can be 
interpreted as the marginal equity value of loan rate in the SC  option valuation, while the second term can be 
interpreted as the marginal knock-out value of loan rate. The optimal loan rate is determined where both the marginal 
value are equal. Similarly, the optimal deposit rate is determined where the marginal equity value of deposit rate in 
the SC  option valuation equals the marginal knock-out value of deposit rate. We can further substitute both the 
optimal loan and deposit rates to obtain the default probability in Eq. (3) and the liability value in Eq. (4) staying on 
the optimization. 
Having examined the solutions to the bank’s optimization problem, we consider the effects on the optimal loan rate 
and deposit rate from changes in the amount of credit risk hedging. These results will be used when the two effects 
on default risk and liability value are analyzed. Implicitly differentiating Eqs. (5) and (6) with respect to  , and then 
solving for these effects using Cramer’s rule yield: 
2 2 2 2
2( ) /
L
L D L D D
R D O C D O C D O C D O C
R R R R R  
             
                (8) 
2 2 2 2
2( ) /
D
L D L D L
R D O C D O C D O C D O C
R R R R R  
             
                (9) 
We consider next the impacts on the default risk in the bank’s equity return and the liability value from changes in the 
level of credit risk hedging. Differentiating Eqs. (3) and (4) evaluated at the optimal loan rate and deposit rate with 
respect to   yields, respectively: 
+def def def defL D
L D
dP P P PR R
d R R   
                              (10) 
+ L D
L D
R RdIns Ins Ins Ins
d R R   
                               (11) 
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (10) can be identified as the direct effect, while the second and third 
terms can be identified as the indirect effect. The direct effect captures the change in defP  due to an increase in  , 
holding the optimal loan and deposit rates constant. The indirect effect arises because an increases in   changes in 
defP  by ( )LL R  and ( )DD R  evaluated at the optimal rates in every possible state. This indirect effect 
demonstrates the effect of   on defP  when loan rate and deposit rate decisions are made simultaneously. The 
interpretation of Eq. (11) follows a similar argument as in the case of Eq. (10). 
The added complexity of the barrier option with credit risk hedging does not always lead to clear-cut results in 
particular when the simultaneous effects are analyzed. However, we can certainly speak of tendencies for reasonable 
parameter levels corresponding to Eqs. (8) and (9) with DOC  of Eq. (2), Eqs. (10) with defP  of Eq. (3), and Eqs. 
(11) with Ins  of Eq. (4) associated with the equilibrium condition of Eqs. (5) and (6). Toward that end, we 
compute derivatives of the value function of barrier. The numerical examples provide intuition regarding the 
problems at hand, i.e., the comparative static results of Eq. (8) ~ (11) in our model. 
5. Numerical Analysis 
In the following numerical analysis, the parameter values, unless otherwise indicated, are assumed to be 4.0%R  , 
0.25%  , 8.5%q  , and 0.3  . Let ( %, )LR L  change from (4.5, 200) to (5.1, 179) in order to capture 
the mentioned conditions of / 0LL R    and 2 2/ 0LL R   . Let ( %, )DR D  change from (3.5, 206) to (2.9, 
185) to capture the conditions of / 0DD R    and 2 2/ 0DD R   . These parameter levels used for our 
analysis are explained as follows. (i) The assumption of DR R  is made based on the argument of Wong (1997), 
implying that the capital requirement constraint will binding as long as R  is sufficiently larger than DR . (ii) 
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0.25%   demonstrates the price of hedging credit risk where ( )LR R  . If the price is high where 
( )LR R  , the bank has no incentives to participate in the hedging transaction, instead of shifting its 
investments to the liquid-asset market from its loan portfolio. (iii) The specification of capital adequacy requirement 
is consistent with the Basel approach, which is set by the capital-to-deposits ratio / 8.5%K D q   (VanHoose, 
2007). For example, if 185D  , then 15.725K   at 8.5%q  . In this case, the capital-to-asset ratio is 
7.8625% when 200L  . The bundle of ( %, ) (2.9,185)DR D   is invalid for our analysis since the capital 
adequacy requirement is not met. But if 191D  , then 16.235K   at 8.5%q  . Under the circumstances, 
the capital-to-asset ratio is 8.12% when 200L  , which meets the requirement. (iv) The condition of L DR R  
indicates that bank interest margin is a proxy for the efficiency of financial intermediation (Saunders and 
Schumacher, 2000). (v) The condition of LR R  implies the scope for asset substitution (Kashyap et al., 2002). 
First of all, we compute equity components of bank value including SC , DIC , and DOC  based on Eq. (2) at 
0.1   and 0.6b   (Note 5). The findings are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Equity components of bank value at 0.1   
 ( %, )LR L  
( %, )DR D  (4.5, 200) (4.6, 199) (4.7, 197) (4.8, 194) (4.9, 190) (5.0, 185) (5.1, 179)
 SC  
(3.5, 206) 33.3059 33.3353 33.2535 33.0593 32.7517 32.3300 31.7939
(3.4, 205) 33.4721 33.5015 33.4194 33.2245 32.9158 32.4927 31.9549
(3.3, 203) 33.5805 33.6097 33.5270 33.3311 33.0209 32.5959 32.0557
(3.2, 200) 33.6292 33.6580 33.5744 33.3770 33.0649 32.6374 32.0942
(3.1, 196) 33.6163 33.6445 33.5597 33.3605 33.0460 32.6154 32.0685
(3.0, 191) 33.5403 33.5677 33.4813 33.2800 32.9626 32.5284 31.9771
(2.9, 185) 33.3999 33.4262 33.3381 33.1342 32.8135 32.3751 31.8186
 DIC
(3.5, 206) 0.0175 0.0171 0.0164 0.0155 0.0144 0.0132 0.0118
(3.4, 205) 0.0173 0.0168 0.0162 0.0153 0.0142 0.0130 0.0117
(3.3, 203) 0.0172 0.0168 0.0161 0.0152 0.0142 0.0129 0.0116
(3.2, 200) 0.0173 0.0168 0.0162 0.0153 0.0142 0.0130 0.0117
(3.1, 196) 0.0175 0.0170 0.0164 0.0155 0.0144 0.0132 0.0118
(3.0, 191) 0.0179 0.0174 0.0167 0.0158 0.0147 0.0135 0.0121
(2.9, 185) 0.0185 0.0180 0.0173 0.0163 0.0152 0.0140 0.0126
 DOC
(3.5, 206) 33.2884 33.3182 33.2371 33.0438 32.7373 32.3168 31.7821
(3.4, 205) 33.4548 33.4846 33.4032 33.2092 32.9016 32.4797 31.9433
(3.3, 203) 33.5633 33.5930 33.5109 33.3159 33.0068 32.5829 32.0441
(3.2, 200) 33.6119 33.6412 33.5582 33.3617 33.0507 32.6244 32.0825
(3.1, 196) 33.5988 33.6275 33.5433 33.3450 33.0316 32.6022 32.0566
(3.0, 191) 33.5224 33.5502 33.4646 33.2642 32.9479 32.5149 31.9649
(2.9, 185) 33.3815 33.4083 33.3208 33.1179 32.7982 32.3611 31.8061
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , 0.1  , and 
0.6b  . 
 
In Table 1, we present the computed results that 0SC  , 0DIC  , and 0DOC  . Consistent with the 
empirical findings of Brockman and Turtle (2003), we argue that the barrier option framework is a good 
representation of reality because the knock-out value of DIC  is positive. Market-based estimates of bank equity 
which ignore the barrier lead to overestimation. More importantly, the shaded areas represent an approximate optimal 
loan rate 4.6% at various levels of deposit rate and an approximate optimal deposit rate 3.2% at various levels of loan 
rate. The maximum DOC  value is 33.6412 at the optimal rate bundle ( %, %) (4.6, 3.2)L DR R   with given 
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parameter values of 0.1   and 0.6b  . These results will be used for the following computational exercises. 
Table 2. Values of DOC  at various level of   where / 0LDOC R    or / 0DDOC R    
 ( %, )DR D   (3.5, 206) (3.4, 205) (3.3, 203) (3.2, 200) (3.1, 196) (3.0, 191) (2.9, 185)
 DOC  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   where / 0LDOC R  
0.10 33.3182 33.4846 33.5930 33.6412 33.6275 33.5502 33.4083
0.15 32.1339 32.2965 32.4001 32.4428 32.4226 32.3380 32.1877
0.20 30.9606 31.1195 31.2185 31.2554 31.2285 31.1362 30.9772
0.25 29.8006 29.9560 30.0503 30.0814 30.0474 29.9469 29.7787
0.30 28.6569 28.8088 28.8984 28.9235 28.8822 28.7730 28.5948
0.35 27.5330 27.6817 27.7665 27.7854 27.7364 27.6180 27.4290
 ( %, )LR L   (4.5, 200) (4.6, 199) (4.7, 197) (4.8, 194) (4.9, 190) (5.0, 185) (5.1, 179)
 DOC  at ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D   where / 0DDOC R  
0.10 33.6119 33.6412 33.5582 33.3617 33.0507 32.6244 32.0825
0.15 32.4062 32.4428 32.3740 32.1988 31.9160 31.5250 31.0257
0.20 31.2112 31.2554 31.2013 31.0476 30.7935 30.4383 29.9821
0.25 30.0293 30.0814 30.0422 29.9105 29.6856 29.3669 28.9545
0.30 28.8631 28.9235 28.8997 28.7906 28.5955 28.3139 27.9461
0.35 27.7163 27.7854 27.7775 27.6917 27.5272 27.2836 26.9614
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . The 
results at 0.1   are obtained from the shaded areas in Table 1. 
 
It is required to compute the DOC  value at various level of   for the comparative static analysis of Eqs. (8) ~ 
(11). The upper panel of Table 2 demonstrates the DOC  with the condition of / 0LDOC R    at various 
levels of ( %, )DR D  and  , while the lower panel demonstrates the DOC  with the condition of 
/ 0DDOC R    at various levels of ( %, )LR L  and  . The maximum DOC  value is 33.6412 at the 
optimal rate bundle ( %, %) (4.6, 3.2)L DR R   when 0.1  , as shown in Table 1, 33.4428 when 
0.15, , etc   . It is interesting that, as the value of credit risk hedging increases, DOC  value is decreased. 
The result is understood because credit risk hedging is costly. 
Before proceeding with the analysis of Eqs. (8) and (9), we need to confirm the second-order and stability conditions 
based on Eqs. (5) ~ (7). The findings are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Values of 2 2/ LDOC R  , 2 / L DDOC R R   , 2 2/ DDOC R  , 2 / D LDOC R R   , and   at various levels of 
  
  2 2/ LDOC R   2 / L DDOC R R    2 2/ DDOC R   2 / D LDOC R R      
0.10 -9.0208 0.0398 -6.1924 0.0398 55.8587
0.15 -9.0481 0.0394 -6.2835 0.0394 56.8518
0.20 -9.0842 0.0392 -6.3860 0.0392 58.0099
0.25 -9.1294 0.0393 -6.5021 0.0393 59.3586
0.30 -9.1837 0.0396 -6.6346 0.0396 60.9292
0.35 -9.2472 0.0402 -6.7871 0.0402 62.7603
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . The 
results are computed based on the conditions of DOC  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   and ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D  , which 
are observed from the shaded areas in Table 2. 
 
In Table 3, we show that the equilibrium is locally strictly stable, which implies that 2 2/ 0LD R   , 
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2 2/ 0DD R   , and 0  . The term 2 / / ( / ) 0L D D LDOC R R R DOC R          indicates that the 
bank regards its deposit rate as a strategic complement to its loan rate in retail banking. With a strategic complement, 
the deposit rate responds to more aggressive play with more aggressive play (increases the loan rate). The term 
2 / / ( / ) 0D L L DDOC R R R DOC R          demonstrates that the bank also regards its loan rate as a 
strategic complement to its deposit rate. 
Table 4. Responsiveness of bank optimal loan rate and deposit rate to   
  2 / LDOC R     2 / DDOC R     /LR    /DR    
0.10→0.15 1.4645 1.1154 -0.1631 -0.1812 
0.15→0.20 1.5174 1.1391 -0.1685 -0.1823 
0.20→0.25 1.5805 1.1676 -0.1748 -0.1839 
0.25→0.30 1.6564 1.2025 -0.1822 -0.1860 
0.30→0.35 1.7487 1.2454 -0.1912 -0.1889 
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . The 
results are computed based on the conditions of DOC  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   and ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D  , which 
are observed from the shaded areas in Table 2. 
 
The results of Eqs. (8) and (9) based on the computed results presented in Table 4 are stated in the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1. An increase in the amount of credit risk hedging simultaneously decreases the loan rate and the deposit 
rate, increases the bank interest margin when the amount of credit risk hedging is low, and decreases the margin 
when the amount of credit risk hedging is high. 
As the bank increasingly gets involved in credit risk hedging activity, it now provides a return to a less credit risk 
base. One way the bank may attempt to augment its total returns is by shifting its investments to its loan portfolio 
and away from the liquid-asset market. If loan demand is relatively rate-elastic, a larger loan portfolio is possible at a 
reduced loan rate. Our findings are consistent with Pausch and Welzel (2012): a bank increases loan volume and 
decreases interest rate on loans as a reaction to a decrease in credit risk by hedging, and Bedendo and Bruno (2012): 
credit risk transfer practices (credit risk hedging in our model) increase loan risk taking. As the bank increases the 
credit risk hedging transaction, it also provides a return to a higher hedging cost base. An alternative way the bank 
may attempt to augment its total returns is by decreasing its deposit volume as a reaction to an increase in hedging 
cost. If deposit supply is relatively rate-elastic, a smaller deposit volume is possible at a reduced deposit rate. 
In addition, it is interesting that, as the amount of credit risk hedging increases, both the loan rate and the deposit rate 
are decreased, but the bank interest margin is increased when the hedging amount is a small scale and the margin is 
decreased when the hedging amount is large. The result is understood because the credit risk is less likely come into 
effect and the hedging cost is less likely to vanish, as the hedging amount increases. As noted earlier, the bank 
interest margin is one of the principal elements of bank earnings. Credit risk hedging as such makes the bank more 
prone to loan risk taking and less deposit cost burden when the hedging is at a lower level, thereby constituting bank 
profitability, but adversely affecting the stability of the banking system. Williams (2007) finds empirical evidence 
that bank interest margin is negatively related to credit risk (implying that positively related to credit risk hedging); 
however, Maudos and de Guevara (2004) finds empirical evident that bank interest margin is positively related to 
credit risk (implying that negatively related to credit risk hedging). Thus, their alternative findings lend support to 
Proposition 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.sciedu.ca/rwe Research in World Economy Vol. 6, No. 1; 2015 
Published by Sciedu Press                        127                         ISSN 1923-3981  E-ISSN 1923-399X 
Table 5. Values of defP  at various levels of   where / 0LDOC R    or / 0DDOC R    
 ( %, )DR D   (3.5, 206) (3.4, 205) (3.3, 203) (3.2, 200) (3.1, 196) (3.0, 191) (2.9, 185)
 defP  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   where / 0LDOC R  
0.10 0.0484 0.0479 0.0475 0.0474 0.0475 0.0478 0.0484
0.15 0.0458 0.0453 0.0450 0.0448 0.0450 0.0453 0.0459
0.20 0.0431 0.0425 0.0422 0.0421 0.0422 0.0426 0.0433
0.25 0.0401 0.0395 0.0392 0.0391 0.0393 0.0397 0.0404
0.30 0.0368 0.0363 0.0360 0.0360 0.0361 0.0366 0.0373
0.35 0.0333 0.0328 0.0325 0.0325 0.0327 0.0332 0.0339
 ( %, )LR L   (4.5, 200) (4.6, 199) (4.7, 197) (4.8, 194) (4.9, 190) (5.0, 185) (5.1, 179)
 defP  at ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D   where / 0DDOC R  
0.10 0.0480 0.0474 0.0466 0.0455 0.0443 0.0428 0.0410
0.15 0.0455 0.0448 0.0440 0.0430 0.0417 0.0402 0.0384
0.20 0.0427 0.0421 0.0413 0.0402 0.0389 0.0374 0.0356
0.25 0.0398 0.0391 0.0383 0.0372 0.0359 0.0344 0.0326
0.30 0.0366 0.0360 0.0351 0.0340 0.0327 0.0312 0.0294
0.35 0.0332 0.0325 0.0316 0.0306 0.0293 0.0277 0.0260
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . 
 
It is necessary to elaborate on default risk issue. The upper panel of Table 5 demonstrates the defP  value with the 
condition of / 0LDOC R    at various levels of ( %, )DR D  and  , while the lower panel demonstrates the 
defP  value with the condition of / 0DDOC R    at various levels of ( %, )LR L  and  . The default 
probability is 0.0474 at the optimal rate bundle ( %, %,) (4.6, 3.2)L DR R   with 0.10  , 0.0448 with 
0.20  ,  , etc. These computed results will be used when Eq. (10) are analyzed. 
Table 6. Responsiveness of bank default risk to   
  /defP    /def LP R   /def DP R   /defdP d  
0.10→0.15 -0.0508 -0.0061 0.0013 -0.0500 
0.15→0.20 -0.0548 -0.0062 0.0011 -0.0539 
0.20→0.25 -0.0592 -0.0063 0.0009 -0.0582 
0.25→0.30 -0.0639 -0.0064 0.0007 -0.0628 
0.30→0.35 -0.0689 -0.0065 0.0005 -0.0678 
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . The 
results are computed based on the conditions of defP  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   and ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D  , which 
are observed from the shaded areas in Table 5. 
 
The result of Eq. (10) based on the observation shown in Table 6 are stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. As increase in the amount of credit risk hedging decreases the default risk in the bank’s equity return. 
In Eq. (10), the direct effect captures the change in defP  due to an increase in  , holding the loan rate and the 
deposit rate constant. It is unambiguously negative ( / 0defP     observed from Table 6) because an increase in 
credit risk hedging results in decreasing the bank’s default risk, ceteris paribus. The indirect effect on the default risk 
from an increase in   through the loan rate adjustment ( / )( / )def L LP R R      is positive in sign, where 
/ 0def LP R    is observed from Table 6 and / 0LR     is observed from Table 4. The result is understood 
because an increase in credit risk hedging decreases the loan rate. Loan rate determination as such makes the bank 
more prone to loan risk-taking, thereby increasing the default risk in the bank’s equity return. In addition, the indirect 
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effect on the default risk from an increase in   through DR  adjustment ( / )( / )def D DP R R      is negative 
in sign. The result is understood because an increase in the credit risk hedging decreases the deposit rate. Deposit rate 
determination as such makes the bank less deposit cost burden, thereby decreasing the default risk in the bank’s 
equity return. Since the positive indirect effect through loan rate adjustment is insufficient to offset the direct effect 
and the negative indirect effect through deposit rate adjustment reinforces the direct effect, both the effects give an 
overall negative response of defP  to an increase in  . As a result, we show that an increase in the credit risk 
hedging decreases the default risk in the bank’s equity return. Our result can be used to explain the aforementioned 
findings of Wagner and Marsh (2006). 
Table 7. Values of Ins  at various levels of   where / 0LDOC R    or / 0DDOC R    
 ( %, )DR D   (3.5, 206) (3.4, 205) (3.3, 203) (3.2, 200) (3.1, 196) (3.0, 191) (2.9, 185)
 Ins  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   where / 0LDOC R  
0.10 154.0204 153.8540 153.7456 153.6974 153.7111 153.7884 153.9303
0.15 144.7970 144.6344 144.5308 144.4881 144.5083 144.5929 144.7432
0.20 135.5626 135.4037 135.3047 135.2678 135.2947 135.3870 135.5460
0.25 126.3149 126.1595 126.0652 126.0341 126.0681 126.1686 126.3368
0.30 117.0509 116.8990 116.8094 116.7843 116.8256 116.9348 117.1130
0.35 107.7671 107.6184 107.5336 107.5147 107.5637 107.6821 107.8711
 ( %, )LR L   (4.5, 200) (4.6, 199) (4.7, 197) (4.8, 194) (4.9, 190) (5.0, 185) (5.1, 179)
 Ins  at ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D   where / 0DDOC R    
0.10 154.4881 153.6974 152.0749 149.6191 146.3283 142.2006 137.2336
0.15 145.2438 144.4881 142.9461 140.6164 137.4975 133.5875 128.8840
0.20 135.9888 135.2678 133.8059 131.6020 128.6545 124.9617 120.5211
0.25 126.7207 126.0341 124.6521 122.5735 119.7969 116.3206 112.1423
0.30 117.4369 116.7843 115.4816 113.5278 110.9215 107.6611 103.7442
0.35 108.1337 107.5147 106.2908 104.4611 102.0243 98.9789 95.3224
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . 
 
Table 8. Responsiveness of Ins  to   
  /Ins    / LIns R   / DIns R   /dIns d  
0.10→0.15 -184.1858 -7.9068 0.4820 -182.9832 
0.15→0.20 -184.4071 -7.5570 0.4263 -183.2115 
0.20→0.25 -184.6729 -7.2099 0.3693 -183.4807 
0.25→0.30 -184.9958 -6.8659 0.3109 -183.8024 
0.30→0.35 -185.3928 -6.5257 0.2508 -184.1923 
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , 0.3  , and 0.6b  . The 
results are computed based on the conditions of Ins  at ( %, ) (4.6, 199)LR L   and ( %, ) (3.2, 200)DR D  , which 
are observed from the shaded areas in Table 7. 
 
We use the results observed from Tables 4, 7, and 8 to explain the comparative static results of Eq. (11). The upper 
panel in Table 7 indicates the Ins  value with the condition of / 0LDOC R    at various levels of 
( %, )DR D  and  , while the lower panel indicates the Ins  value with the condition of / 0DDOC R    at 
various levels of ( %, )LR L  and  . The values presented in Table 8 are computed based on the observations in 
Tables 4 and 7. Accordingly, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. An increase in the amount of credit risk hedging decreases the bank’s liability. 
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The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) can be identified as the direct effect, which captures the change in 
Ins  due to an increase in  , holding both the optimal loan rate and deposit rate constant. It is unambiguously 
negative ( / 0Ins     obtained from Table 8) because, as the credit risk hedging increases, resulting in 
decreasing the value of bank loans due to hedging cost increased, the value of the FDIC’s contingent liability is 
increased, but the value of the FDIC’s contingent asset is decreased, ceteris paribus. The second term can be 
identified the indirect effect, which captures the change in Ins  due to an increase in   through the loan rate 
adjustment. It is positive in sign since / 0LR     is obtained from Table 4 and / 0LIns R    is obtained 
from Table 8. The result is understood because an increase in the credit risk hedging spurs loan risk taking and hence 
increases the bank’s liability. The third term can be identified the indirect effect, which captures the change in Ins  
due to an increase in   through the deposit rate adjustment. This effect is negative in sign since / 0DR     is 
obtained from Table 4 and / 0DIns R    is obtained is obtained from Table 8. The result is understood because 
an increase in the credit risk hedging decreases deposit cost burden and hence decreases the bank’s liability. The total 
indirect effect is positive because the former negative effect is insufficient to offset the latter positive effect. Since the 
positive total indirect effect is insufficient to offset the negative direct effect to give an overall negative response of 
Ins  to an increase in  , we have the result of Proposition 3. 
Table 9. Responsiveness of LR , DR , defP , and Ins  to   at various levels of b  
 b   0.6 0.7 0.8 
 / ( %, %)L L DR R R 
0.10→0.15 -0.1631 (4.6, 3.2) -0.1185 (4.6, 3.2) -0.0691 (5.0, 3.2) 
0.15→0.20 -0.1685 (4.6, 3.2) -0.1306 (4.6, 3.2) -0.0694 (5.0, 3.2) 
0.20→0.25 -0.1748 (4.6, 3.2) -0.1454 (4.6, 3.2) -0.0726 (5.0, 3.2) 
0.25→0.30 -0.1822 (4.6, 3.2) -0.1640 (4.6, 3.2) -0.0805 (5.0, 3.2) 
0.30→0.35 -0.1912 (4.6, 3.2) - -0.0958 (5.0, 3.2) 
 /DR    
0.10→0.15 -0.1812 -0.1732  -0.1682 
0.15→0.20 -0.1823 -0.1742  -0.1661 
0.20→0.25 -0.1839 -0.1756  -0.1640 
0.25→0.30 -0.1860 -0.1775  -0.1620 
0.30→0.35 -0.1889 -0.1695  -0.1601 
 /defdP d  
0.10→0.15 -0.0500 -0.1202 -0.2196 
0.15→0.20 -0.0539 -0.1312 -0.2421 
0.20→0.25 -0.0582 -0.1436 -0.2676 
0.25→0.30 -0.0628 -0.1575 -0.2964 
0.30→0.35 -0.0678 - -0.3290 
 /dIns d
0.10→0.15 -182.9832 -185.0235 -184.8400 
0.15→0.20 -183.2115 -185.1156 -184.7438 
0.20→0.25 -183.4807 -185.2308 -184.5040 
0.25→0.30 -183.8024 -185.3759 -184.0771 
0.30→0.35 -184.1923 - -183.4038 
Notes: Parameter values, unless stated otherwise: 4.0%R  , 0.25%  , 8.5%q  , and 0.3  . The results at 
0.6b   and 0.7  ( 0.8b  ) are computed based on the values of DOC , defP , and Ins  at the optimal loan rate of 
4.6% (5.0%) and the optimal deposit rate of 3.2%. The results at 0.6b   are collected from Tables 4, 6, and 8. The 
results at 0.7b   and 0.8  are obtained by following the similar computation as in the case of 0.6b  . 
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The results of Eqs. (8) ~ (11) at various levels of regulatory deposit insurance fund protection presented in Table 9 
are stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. An increase in the credit risk hedging decreases the optimal loan rate, the optimal deposit rate, the 
default risk in the bank’s equity return, and the bank’s liability. An increase in the regulatory deposit insurance fund 
protection weakens the reduction in the optimal loan rate and the optimal deposit rate, and reinforces the reduction in 
the default risk. 
It is necessary to elaborate on the regulatory deposit insurance fund protection issue. The results presented in Tables 
1 ~ 8 are based on the case of 0.6b  . We further consider the results at various levels of 0.7b   and 0.8. The 
findings are summarized in Table 9. In the first panel, we show that an increase in the credit risk hedging increases 
the loan amount held by the bank at a reduced loan rate. Furthermore, the negative impact on loan rate is reduced as 
the insurer increases the protection of deposit insurance fund. We argue that the credit risk hedging results in 
increasing loan risk taking, which is reduced by increasing the regulatory deposit insurance fund protection. The 
FDIC as a regulator and insurer controls the barrier related to deposit insurance fund protection in a very direct 
manner by the power vested in it by the FDICIA. Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the deposit 
insurance fund reserve ratio reach 1.35 percent by 2020 (the actual reserve ratio is 0.45 percent in 2012), as noted 
earlier. Our result suggests that the incentive of an individual bank to transfer credit risk with credit derivatives is 
aligned with the regulatory objective of reducing risk taking, which is consistent with the finding of Wagner and 
Marsh (2006). 
In the second panel, we show that an increase in the credit risk hedging decreases the deposit volume absorbed by the 
bank at a reduced deposit rate. The negative impact on deposit rate is reduced as the insurer increases its deposit 
insurance fund protection. We argue that the credit risk hedging results in decreasing deposit cost burden, which is 
further reduced by increasing the insurance fund protection. Regulation with the FDICIA and the Dodd-Frank Act as 
such is expected to reach the goal of increasing the deposit insurance fund reserve ratio. In the third panel, we find 
that an increase in the credit risk hedging decreases the default risk in the bank’s equity return. The negative impact 
on the default risk is increased by increasing the insurance fund protection. Thus, our result can be used to explain 
the aforementioned finding of Wagner and Marsh (2006). In the last panel, we find that an increase in the credit risk 
hedging consistently decreases the value of the bank’s liability at various levels of the regulatory deposit insurance 
fund protection. However, deposit insurance fund protection does not always reinforce this reduction in the bank’s 
liability value depending on the FDIC’s claim liability value and the bank’s knock-out value. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we model a bank taking deposits and granting risky loans which is subject to regulatory deposit 
insurance fund protection and may engage in credit risk hedging in a financial turmoil. We take specific care to 
integrate deposit insurance fund protection related to the FDICIA and the Dodd-Frank Act into the barrier option 
valuation approach to retail banking for our analysis of spread behavior and default probability of an individual bank. 
This enables us to examine the interaction of deposit insurance fund protection and credit risk hedging. We find that 
an increase in the bank’s credit risk hedging simultaneously decreases its loan rate and deposit rate, and thus 
increases its interest margin when the credit risk hedging scale is not large. As a result, we argue that the credit risk 
hedging practice increases loan risk taking but decreases deposit cost and hence increases the bank’s profit. 
Furthermore, the regulatory deposit insurance fund protection weakens increased loan risk taking and decreased 
deposit cost. In addition, we also find that an increase in the bank’s credit risk hedging decreases the default risk, and 
further the negative impact is increased as the deposit insurance fund protection increases. Our findings support a 
common view that credit risk hedging increases loan risk taking. However, our analysis suggests that the incentive of 
an individual bank to hedge credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of deposit insurance fund protection 
of improving stability, and so the credit risk hedging practices are to be welcomed. More importantly, the credit risk 
hedging practices with regulatory deposit insurance fund protection largely meet the requirement of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. 
One issue that has not been addressed is the alternative credit risk transfer tools of loan sales and securitization that 
also have been extensively used by banks to manage credit risk actively. In particular, is it the case that the results of 
this paper also apply to the alternative case? We are silent on this question and do not attempt to compare the 
efficiency of the credit derivatives to alternative instruments. Such concerns are beyond the scope of this paper and 
so are not addressed here. What this paper does demonstrate, however, is the important role played by credit risk 
hedging aligned with regulatory deposit insurance fund protection in affecting bank spread behavior and financial 
stability in retail banking. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Credit risk transfer tools in general include loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives. This paper 
focuses only on credit derivatives that insure banks against the default risk of their borrowers in exchange for a fee. 
See Bedendo and Bruno (2012) for the joint usage of the three credit risk transfer tools. Hirtle (2009) indicates that 
those tools are normally seen by banks as complements rather than as substitutes. 
Note 2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 334(d), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1539 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1817(nt)). 
Note 3. Wagner and Marsh (2006) suggest that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the 
regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instrument is to be 
welcomed. 
Note 4. One can attach two interpretations to the parameter  . When transferring credit risk to another investor, a 
bank incurs two major costs: the lemons premium that the investor charges because of the bank’s inside information 
regarding the credit risk and moral hazard resulting in inefficient control by the lender of borrowers’ default risks 
(Duffie, 2008). It is suggested that further modeling these two major costs is required to analyze credit risk transfer 
transactions, but not our primary focus in this paper. 
Note 5. According to the empirical findings in Brockman and Turtle (2003), average barrier estimates by years are 
ranged from 0.5900 to 0.8395. 
